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More than thirty-five years ago, Milton
Friedman initiated an intense “rules versus
discretion” debate by calling for the Federal
Reserve to maintain constant growth of the
money supply (Friedman 1959). The focus of
this early debate was on whether an active
monetary policy or a passive monetary policy
is more successful at stabilizing output. Over
the years, the debate has continued, but its
terms have shifted.
First, large swings in the velocities of
the monetary aggregates have led many econo-
mists to turn away from Friedman’s constant-
money-growth prescription, toward policy rules
that are more directly concerned with output
and prices.
Second, in a very real sense the debate is no
longer over “rules versus discretion” but “which
rule?” It’s now taken for granted that the monetary
authority follows a rule of some kind—albeit a
rule that may not be clearly articulated and that
may shift in response to changes in the composi-
tion of the authority’s councils or changes in
policymakers’ understanding of how the economy
operates. The behaviors of private agents are
conditioned on how they expect the monetary
authority to react to future shocks to the economy
(Lucas 1976). Consequently, future policy choices
cannot be treated as exogenous.
Finally, there is increased recognition that in
monetary affairs—as in so many other areas of
life—expedient policies are rarely the best poli-
cies. Moreover, to obtain a socially optimal
outcome today may require that policymakers
find a way to convince the private sector that
shortsighted policies will not be pursued in the
future (Barro and Gordon 1983, Kydland and
Prescott 1977). In particular, the experience of
the 1970s has led to a consensus that the pri-
vate sector must never be given grounds for
doubting the Federal Reserve’s commitment to
long-run price stability.
While there is a consensus that monetary
policy must be conducted within a framework in
which people are confident of a low long-run
inflation rate, there is little agreement on how the
Federal Reserve ought to allow prices to respond
to shocks over the near term. This article attempts
to shed light on the short-run stabilization issue
within the context of an economy subject to
productivity shocks, with sticky nominal wages.
The article shows that the optimal monetary
policy rule in such an economy has the Federal
Reserve target a geometric weighted average of
output and the price level. In a realistic special
case, the monetary authority should target nomi-
nal spending.
While there is a consensus
that monetary policy must be
conducted within a framework
in which people are confident of
a low long-run inflation rate,
there is little agreement on how
the Federal Reserve ought to
allow prices to respond to shocks
over the near term. This article
shows that the optimal mone-
tary policy rule has the Federal
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weighted average of output
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The analysis is subject to a number of
limitations. The model economy is not subject to
any disturbances other than aggregate produc-
tivity shocks. There is no attempt to explicitly
model the adverse effects of inflation. Nor does
the article model how the Federal Reserve would
actually go about implementing alternative
policy rules. In the real world, some rules may
have fewer informational requirements than
others or may imply less extreme movements
in policy instruments. Implementation errors
are likely to be smaller for such rules, enhancing
their performance.
This article has implications that extend
beyond the short-run stabilization issue. Thus,
this article illustrates that real-business-cycle
models may accurately describe the historical
behavior of an economy and yet be a poor
guide to policy. That a large fraction of the
business cycle can be attributed to supply
shocks may mean not that monetary policy is
ineffective but that the Federal Reserve has been
doing its job. More generally, neither monetary
policy nor private contracts should be analyzed
in isolation. Policies optimal under one system
of private contracts may perform poorly under
a different system. Conversely, the performance
of a given system of private contracts may be
sensitive to the policy rule adopted by the mone-
tary authority.
A simple model of aggregate supply
This section analyzes output determina-
tion and optimal monetary policy in a competi-
tive economy subject to aggregate productivity
shocks.1 Initially, all prices are assumed to be
perfectly flexible, so that markets clear instan-
taneously from period to period. In such an
economy, monetary policy is irrelevant to short-
run output determination. The monetary author-
ity is, therefore, free to focus exclusively on
maintaining price stability. Next, the money wage
rate is assumed to be set one period in advance,
introducing the possibility that output may devi-
ate from its market-clearing level in response to
unexpected shifts in the production function.
Since the money wage rate fails to react to supply
shocks in this economy, the burden of doing so
falls on the monetary authority. The optimal
policy rule has the monetary authority target a
geometric weighted average of output and the
price level. Insofar as the monetary authority is
successful in implementing the optimal rule, the
real economy will behave as if the money wage
rate is perfectly flexible.
Aggregate supply with flexible prices. Profit
maximization implies that the representative
competitive firm will hire labor up to the point
where the marginal product of labor equals the
real wage:
(1) MPN = W/P,
where N denotes hours of work. Suppose, in
particular, that output is produced according to
the function
(2) Y = ΘN 1–β/(1 – β),
where Y is output, 0 < β < 1 is a fixed parameter,
and Θ is a random productivity shock. Equation
1 is then equivalent to
(1′) θ – βn = w – p,
where lowercase letters represent logarithms of
their uppercase counterparts. The demand for
labor is an increasing function of the produc-
tivity shock and a decreasing function of the real
wage. For any given level of hours, a doubling of
Θ doubles the marginal product of labor and,
so, doubles the real wage.
Utility maximization implies that the repre-
sentative household will supply labor up to the
point where the marginal rate of substitution
between leisure and consumption equals the
real wage. Equivalently, each household will
supply labor up to the point where minus the
marginal rate of substitution between labor and
consumption equals the real wage:
(3) –MRSN,C = W/P.
If the representative household’s utility function
takes the form
U(C,N) = (C 1–α – 1)/(1 – α) – N 1+λ/(1 + λ),
where C is consumption and α > 0 and λ > 0
are fixed parameters, then equation 3 is equiva-
lent to
(3′) λn + αc = w – p.
The supply of labor is increasing in the real
wage and decreasing in consumption.
To close the model, take logarithms of
equation 2:
(2′) y = (1 – β)n + θ – ln(1 – β),
and assume that all output is consumed, so that y
can be substituted for c in equation 3′.
The market-clearing values of output, the
real wage, and labor are obtained by simul-26
taneously solving equations 1′, 2′, and 3′:
(4) yA * ( ) ( )ln( ) , =+ − + − []  11 λθ β λ β
(5) ( )* ( ) ln( ) , wp A −= +− − []   αλ θα β β 1
and
(6) nA * ( ) ln( ) , =− + − []  11 αθ α β
where A ≡ [α + β(1 – α) + λ]–1. Equations 4 and
5 say that a positive productivity shock (an in-
crease in θ) raises equilibrium output and the
equilibrium real wage. The impact on equi-
librium hours of work is ambiguous. The higher
real wage that accompanies an increase in pro-
ductivity tends to increase the supply of labor.
This substitution effect is opposed, however,
by a negative wealth effect: as output becomes
more readily available, people are less willing
to work at any given wage. In the real world,
hours of work per person have changed rela-
tively little despite large productivity gains. This
observation suggests that α ≈ 1. If α = 1, the
substitution and wealth effects of an increase in
productivity cancel. Equilibrium output and the
equilibrium real wage rise one-for-one with θ,
while equilibrium hours are constant.
Regardless of the value of α, in a market-
clearing economy the evolution of output is
independent of the evolution of the price level.
Since there is no short-run trade-off between
output stability and price stability, the monetary
authority can concentrate its efforts on achieving
the latter.
Aggregate supply with a predetermined money
wage. Predetermined nominal wages are an
oft-studied source of monetary nonneutrality.2
Moreover, the existence of meaningful nominal
wage rigidities is consistent with several recent
empirical studies (Card 1990, Cho 1993, Cho
and Cooley 1992, McLaughlin 1994). Accord-
ingly, the remainder of this article assumes that
the money wage rate is set, one period in ad-
vance, at its expected market-clearing level and
that firms have discretionary control over hours
of work at the preset wage.3 From equation 5,
the money wage will equal
(7) wpA
ee =+ + − − []  ( ) ln( ) , αλ θ α β β 1
where an e superscript indicates an expected
value conditioned on information available in the
immediately preceding period.
With the money wage set as above, the
representative firm’s profit maximization con-
dition (equation 1′) implies that hours of work
are given by
(8) nn pp A




Substituting into the production function (equa-
tion 2′), one obtains a formula for output:














Output and employment deviate from their
market-clearing levels to the extent that the out-
put price or productivity deviates from values
expected at the time the wage rate was set.
The intuition behind these results is straight-
forward. Consider, first, an unexpected increase
in the price of output. For any given productivity
realization, a surprise price increase lowers the
real wage. Firms move down along their labor
demand schedules, hiring more labor (and ex-
panding production) as the real wage falls.4
Similarly, an increase in productivity causes
firms’ labor demand schedules to shift upward. In
a market-clearing economy, the positive impact
that this upward shift would otherwise have
had on equilibrium hours is partially offset by
an increase in the wage rate as households move
out along their labor supply schedules. When the
money wage is predetermined, this offset can
occur only insofar as the productivity increase
was expected. (Compare equation 5, which ap-
Figure 1
Aggregate Supply in Sticky-Wage and
Flexible-Wage Economies
The aggregate supply curve is vertical when the
money wage is flexible and upward sloping when
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plies to the market-clearing case, with equation
7.) Consequently, surprise increases in produc-
tivity have a larger positive impact on employ-
ment and output than do anticipated increases.
Graphically, the aggregate supply curve
in a flexible-wage economy is vertical at y*.
In contrast, the aggregate supply curve in an
economy with predetermined wages is up-
ward sloping. Figure 1 depicts the case where
θ = θe.
Although both aggregate supply curves shift
to the right in response to a positive unantici-
pated productivity shock, the sticky-wage aggre-
gate supply schedule shifts more. Similarly, a
negative unanticipated productivity shock causes
a larger leftward shift in the sticky-wage aggregate
supply curve than in the flexible-wage aggregate
supply curve (Figure 2).
Optimal policy. Competitive allocations are
efficient. Consequently, policymakers will want
to keep the sticky-wage economy as close to the
market-clearing allocation as possible. However,
the market-clearing levels of output and hours are
not, in general, directly observable. Fortunately,
this problem can be circumvented.
Consider a graphical representation of the
monetary authority’s problem. Figure 3, like Fig-
ure 2, plots three aggregate supply curves, one
for the case in which θ = θ′ < θe, one for the case
in which θ = θe, and one for the case in which
θ = θ″ > θe. The corresponding market-clearing
output levels are denoted y*(θ′),  y*(θe), and
y*(θ″), respectively. The monetary authority
would like the economy to end up at point A ≡
[y*(θ′), p′] in the first case, point B ≡ [y*(θ e), p e]
in the second case, and point C ≡ [y*(θ″), p″]
in the third case. More generally, the monetary
authority would like to restrict the economy to
the line passing through points A, B, and C.
Everywhere along this line, y = y*.
From equation 4, as θ rises from θ e to θ″,
the market-clearing output level rises by
yy A
ee *( ) *( ) ( ) ( ) . ′′ −= + ′′ − θθ λ θ θ 1
From equation 9, the price level changes by
′′ −= − + ′′ − pp A
ee () ( ) . αλ θ θ
Therefore, the line connecting points B and C
has a slope of –(α + λ)/(1 + λ), and the equation
of the line passing through points A, B, and C can
be written
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Figure 2
The Response of Aggregate Supply
To Productivity Shocks
Holding the price level fixed at its expected value,
the sticky-wage aggregate supply curve shifts
farther in response to productivity shocks than




     






In a sticky-wage economy, optimal monetary policy
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Thus, for the monetary authority to guarantee that
period-t output is optimal regardless of the value
of  θt, it is necessary and sufficient that the
authority adjust its policy instruments so as to set















where st is an arbitrary preannounced target. In
the special case where the market-clearing level
of employment is invariant with respect to pro-
ductivity shocks (α = 1), equation 11 reduces to
a nominal spending target:5
(11′) pt + yt = st.
Note that the optimal policy rule does not require
that the monetary authority observe the realized
values of productivity disturbances.
Insofar as the monetary authority is success-
ful in implementing a policy rule of the form
given in equation 11, it will appear that business-
cycle fluctuations can be entirely attributed to
aggregate productivity shocks—and this will,
indeed, be the case.6 However, it would be in-
correct to use this observation as a basis for
concluding that monetary policy is ineffective or
unimportant.
The analysis presented above also illus-
trates a more general point: monetary policy and
private contracting arrangements should be
analyzed as a package. Clearly, optimal mone-
tary policy depends upon private contracting
arrangements. In the example above, the policy
rule given in equation 11 would not be optimal
(or even feasible) in an economy where it was
the price level rather than the wage rate that was
sticky.7 Perhaps less obviously, private agents
may rely upon the monetary authority to pursue
policies that make complicated contingent con-
tracts unnecessary.
Alternative versions
of the optimal policy rule
We have seen that the optimal policy rule
in a sticky-wage economy has the general form
pt + ayt = st (compare equation 11). No re-
strictions are placed on the price–output target,
st, except for the requirement that it be an-
nounced one period in advance.8 This section
shows that a number of prominent proposed
policy rules also have this general form. Some
of these rules are nevertheless suboptimal,
because they put too little weight on output.
Other rules are optimal only under certain con-
ditions.
Price-level and inflation targeting. Under a
price-level target, st is a constant (or, more
generally, a deterministic function of time), and
a is set equal to 0. Under an inflation target, a
is again set equal to 0, but st is defined to equal
pt–1 (or pt–1 plus a constant).
Although the price-level and inflation tar-
geting rules have the same general form as the
optimal policy rule, they are not themselves
optimal because they put zero weight on short-
run output stabilization. In Figure 3, the price-
level and inflation targeting rules would confine
the economy to a horizontal line through point B,
rather than the downward sloping line through
points A and C. Consequently, output fluctuates
too much in response to productivity shocks
under these rules.
Imperfect Implementation of Optimal Policy
There is only a loose connection between variables that are directly affected
by Federal Reserve actions (bank reserves and the federal funds rate) and the
variables that enter the optimal policy rule: aggregate output and the aggregate price
level. Consequently, the Federal Reserve cannot be expected to maintain the
relationship displayed in equation 11 exactly. The unanticipated component of the
error that the Federal Reserve makes in trying to implement equation 11 plays the
role of an aggregate demand shock in the model economy.
To see this, let δ denote the current-period policy implementation error. That













where, as before, s is a preannounced target. This equation can be solved for p and
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Hours respond positively to unanticipated policy implementation errors and ambigu-
ously to productivity shocks.1 Output responds positively to both unanticipated
implementation errors and productivity surprises. Hence, the presence of implemen-
tation errors increases the chances that hours of work will vary procyclically. This
effect is most obvious in the case where α = 1 and is especially likely in the case
where unanticipated implementation errors (δ – δe) are positively correlated with
aggregate productivity shocks (θ – θ e).
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Thus, the price level responds responds positively to unanticipated implementation
errors and negatively to aggregate productivity shocks. The real wage, of course,
moves exactly opposite to the price level.
1 As a technical matter, the anticipated component of the implementation error can always be folded into the
preannounced target, s. That is, one can—without loss of generality—assume δ e ≡ 0.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS 29 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1995
More formally, if strictly adhered to, the
price-level and inflation targeting rules imply that
there are no price surprises: pt = pt
e. But equation
9 tells us that in a sticky-wage economy, price
surprises must partially offset productivity sur-
prises if the economy is to achieve the market-
clearing allocation.
The Hall and Taylor output-gap rules. Robert
Hall (1984) and John Taylor (1985) have pro-
posed that the Federal Reserve adopt a policy rule
of the form
(pt – pT
t ) + a(yt – y T
t ) = 0,
where pT
t  and y T
t  are a target price level and target
output level, respectively, and where a > 0. Re-
arranging terms to obtain
(12) pt + ayt = pT
t + ayT
t ,
we see that the Hall and Taylor rules will have
the same form as the optimal rule derived here
provided that pT
t  and y T
t  are known one period
in advance. Full optimality also requires that a =
(α + λ)/(1 + λ).
In Hall’s analysis, the price target is a
constant. In Taylor’s analysis, pT
t  = pt–1. In either
case, the price target is known as of period t – 1.
Both analyses assume that the output gap, (yt –
y T
t ), is stationary. Therefore, target output and
actual output must have a common permanent
component. If yt is stationary about a determin-
istic trend, it is natural to set target output equal
to trend output. The right-hand side of equa-
tion 12 will be known as of period t – 1. Conse-
quently, the Hall and Taylor rules will have the
optimal form. If output’s permanent component
is a random walk with drift, the situation is a
little more complicated. It will not do to set yT
t
equal to current-period permanent income, be-
cause period-t permanent income is stochastic
from the perspective of period t – 1. However, it
would be consistent with optimality to set yT
t
equal to the previous period’s permanent in-
come plus a constant equal to the drift in perma-
nent income.
Nominal income level and nominal income
growth rules. The simplest versions of the optimal
policy rule set st equal to a deterministic func-
tion of time or equal to (pt –1 + ayt –1) plus a
constant. In particular, if output growth varies
about a well-defined long-run mean, E(∆y), then
setting st equal to aE(∆y)t + s0 or equal to aE(∆y)
+ (pt –1 + ayt–1)—where a = (α + λ)/(1 + λ)—will
yield a policy rule that is optimal and that yields
a zero long-run average rate of inflation. In the
special case where α = 1 (so that also a = 1), these
definitions yield a nominal GDP level rule and a
nominal GDP growth rule, respectively.
Discussion. How is it that so many seem-
ingly very different rules can all be optimal? What
matters for short-run stabilization purposes is
only the relationship between unexpected price
and output changes. Equation 11, which defines
the optimal policy rule, leaves entirely open how
this period’s expected price level should depend
upon past realizations of output and prices.
Differences between rules along this dimension
may have important implications for the distri-
bution of wealth, particularly if debt contracts
are specified in nominal terms. Additionally,
some versions of the optimal rule may be easier
than others for the monetary authority to imple-
ment. Such considerations are outside the scope
of this article.
Summary and concluding remarks
Output and employment tend to be too
responsive to aggregate productivity shocks in
sticky-wage economies. Monetary policy can
offset this tendency by allowing the price level to
fall when output is high and allowing the price
level to rise when output is low. Under optimal
monetary policy, the economy responds to pro-
ductivity shocks exactly as it would in a flexible-
wage economy. Thus, despite a preset money
wage, there are no $20 bills lying on the sidewalk:
there is no loss of economic efficiency.
The optimal policy is sufficiently general
in form to encompass several well-known
policy proposals, including those of Robert Hall
and John Taylor. In the realistic special case in
which the market-clearing level of employ-
ment is independent of productivity, it is optimal
for the monetary authority to target nominal
spending.
It is, of course, possible that private con-
tracts would adapt if the monetary authority
insisted upon pursuing some policy other than
that optimal in a sticky-wage economy.9 The
process of adaptation would likely take some
time, however, and might never be complete. To
minimize transition costs, a monetary authority
choosing to implement some policy other than
that optimal under current contracting arrange-
ments would need to announce its intentions
well in advance.
The particular modeling framework used
in this article is unrealistic in its simplicity, and
the details of the optimal policy rule derived here
are sensitive to changes in model specifica-
tion. However, minor changes in the model are
unlikely to affect the article’s principal con-
clusions:30
1. In a sticky-wage economy, the Federal
Reserve has a short-run output stabiliza-
tion role to play.
2. Several variants of a given rule may have
identical short-term stabilization proper-
ties. Consequently, in choosing between
variants, distributional considerations
and differences in ease of implementa-
tion will likely prove decisive.
3. The fraction of output variation that can
be attributed to aggregate productivity
shocks conveys little useful information
about the importance or effectiveness of
monetary policy.
4. The performance of a given system of
private contracts is sensitive to the policy
rule adopted by the monetary authority.
Conversely, policies optimal under one
system of private contracts may perform
poorly under a different system. Thus,
neither monetary policy nor private con-
tracts should be analyzed in isolation.
Notes
Finn Kydland and Mark Wynne offered helpful com-
ments for this article.
1 The analysis extends Bean (1983) to the case where
labor supply is derived explicitly from utility maximiza-
tion—an extension that has important implications for
the circumstances under which targeting nominal
spending is optimal.
2 See, for example, Fischer (1977), Gray (1978), and
Taylor (1980).
3 Perhaps relocation costs are negligible if workers
switch jobs one period in advance and prohibitive
otherwise. Then the labor market will be competitive ex
ante and monopsonistic ex post. Workers will insist
that some of the terms of their employment be spelled
out in advance. Presetting the nominal wage, while
giving firms control of hours, is an approach that is
often observed in practice (Card 1990). The assump-
tion that the wage is set equal to its expected market-
clearing level is standard in the literature. In the model
developed here, this assumption implies no loss of
efficiency.
4 If monetary-policy-induced price surprises were the
primary driving force behind macroeconomic fluctua-
tions, it would follow that the real wage ought to be
countercyclical. Since the real wage is not, in fact,
countercyclical, economists with strong priors that
monetary policy drives the macroeconomy have in
recent years tended to favor models of price stickiness
over models of wage stickiness. See, for example, Ball
and Mankiw (1994).
5 In contrast, Bean (1983) finds that a nominal spending
target is optimal only if labor is inelastically supplied—
a problematic assumption when firms are given short-
run control of hours. In general, a nominal spending
target is optimal only if n* is independent of productiv-
ity shocks. Because Bean uses an ad hoc labor supply
function that lacks a wealth effect, the only way that he
can make n* independent of θ is by making the supply
of labor independent of the real wage. In the model
developed here, in contrast, n* is independent of θ
whenever α = 1 (compare equation 6).
6 The box entitled “Imperfect Implementation of Optimal
Policy” discusses the behavior of the economy when
the optimal policy is implemented with error.
7 For discussion of optimal policy in an economy with
sticky output prices, see Ireland (1994).
8 More precisely, the target must be announced early
enough that all labor contracts will be renegotiated
before the target becomes binding. The real-world
counterpart to “one period” is, thus, probably one to
three years.
9 This point is not new. According to Fischer (1977,
204), “An attempt by the monetary authority to exploit
the existing structure of contracts to produce behavior
far different from that envisaged when contracts were
signed would likely lead to the reopening of the con-
tracts and, if the new behavior of the monetary authority
were persisted in, a new structure of contracts.”
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